U.S. foreign policy:

Four major approaches have heavily influenced U.S. foreign policy since the nation's earliest days.

  The history of U.S. foreign policy before WW-II "lies buried in obscurity." Aside from particular incidents - such as the Monroe Doctrine, expansion on the North American continent, Theodore Roosevelt's policies, and WW-I - there is little interest in U.S. foreign policy prior to WW-II, and little acceptance of its success.
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  Mead, in "Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World," differs with the latter sentiment and sets forth to cure the former. To assist in rational analysis and discussion, he offers an intellectual framework based on four major approaches that have heavily influenced U.S. foreign policy since the nation's earliest days. See, below, sections beginning with "Four major philosophical influences."
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  In fact, U.S. foreign policy has been extraordinarily successful. Mead provides an impressive list of major foreign policy triumphs, including:

• Obtaining French help to win the American Revolution.

• The Louisiana Purchase.

• Cooperating with Great Britain on the Monroe Doctrine to effectively and inexpensively secure the Western Hemisphere from European incursions.

• Opening Japan to world commerce.

• Blocking Confederate efforts to obtain European help.

• Completing expansion into current continental boundaries.

• The Panama Canal

  Even the much despised Treaty of Versailles has ultimately proven to be a U.S. success. Its noxious impacts were from European initiatives, and have been universally condemned. However, its Wilsonian provisions have - over the decades - become foundation stones in European international politics. These include "self-determination, democratic government, collective security, international law, and a league of nations."

  "France, Germany, Italy, and Britain may have sneered at Wilson, but every one of these powers today conducts its European policy along Wilsonian lines. What was once dismissed as visionary is now accepted as fundamental. This was no mean achievement, and no European statesman of the twentieth century has had as lasting, as benign, or as widespread an influence."

  The U.S. has certainly made mistakes, Mead concedes, "but overall its diplomacy has been remarkably successful." Indeed, he insists, there is no modern nation anywhere that has had nearly as successful a foreign policy. He takes a dim view of the foreign policy accomplishments of the world's other major nations.

  Mead's positive view of U.S. foreign policy is certainly correct. However, he overstates his case in this initial part of his book when comparing U.S. accomplishments with those of the European powers. The U.S., after all, has had a much easier time of it, with its two oceanic borders and weak neighbors - as Mead elsewhere recognizes.
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  For example, Mead demeans Bismarck's unification of Germany as a "delicate" accomplishment. This is patently false. Bismarck gave explicit instructions of the method needed to maintain his Germany as the dominant power in Europe - simply avoid any conflict with Russia and France at the same time. It took some world-class stupidity by his successors to undermine his accomplishments.
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  And Britain has been successfully safeguarding its precious and developing freedoms against the greatest powers Europe could generate for 500 years. Its exhaustion after bearing the brunt of WW-I and WW-II was no fault of its foreign policy. Indeed, its survival as a major European power through the tumultuous 20th century is a spectacular foreign policy accomplishment. Its recognition of its shared interests with the U.S. is a spectacular example of maturity and enlightened self interest - for which the U.S. should be truly grateful. In subsequent chapters, Mead gives Britain's foreign policy prowess more of its due.
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   In fact, almost all the European states - even some of the smaller ones - have played significant roles at various times over the last 500 years in preventing domination of Europe by its most powerful nation - whether 16th century Spain, 18th and early 19th century France, Germany in the first half of the 20th century or the Soviet Union in the second half. Without this continued success, Europe could very easily have wound up like China - uniformly autocratic, without a Renaissance or a Reformation or a scientific method or an industrial revolution or broad-based civil society or development of systems of economic and political freedom and individual liberty.
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  The U.S. has a mere 300 years of successful world leadership to go before it can compare its foreign policy prowess with that of Great Britain.

A history of foreign policy accomplishments:

  Foreign trade was a constant subject of its foreign policy. The decision to cooperate in the British-designed international trading system played a major role in the economic success of the U.S. Tariff policies that benefited industrial New England at the expense of the agricultural South encouraged industrial development but was a source of intense resentment. 

  Mead correctly emphasizes the importance of foreign trade for the 19th century U.S., but he resorts to some dubious statistics to strengthen his case. He compares the trade levels at the end of the 19th century - the first period of globalization - with those of 1948-to-1957 -- a period when all of its primary trading partners were struggling to recover from WW-II, and the drive for trade liberalization after the trade wars of the 1920s and 1930s was in its infancy.

  International trade - especially the vast exports of grains, corn, tobacco and cotton - played a major role in the U.S. economy during the last decades of the 19th century when the U.S. was catapulted into the status of a leading economic power. Foreign investors funded much of the nation's infrastructure. The business cycle in the U.S. was driven to a large extent by conditions in London and other foreign markets.
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During the period between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, "the United States had forces stationed on or near every major continent in the world; its navy was active in virtually every ocean, its troops saw combat on virtually every continent, and its foreign relations were in a perpetual state of crisis and turmoil."

Today, a vastly important and complex global system depends on the continuation of U.S. success in its foreign policy.

  The often rocky relations between the U.S. and the other European powers during the 19th century are sketched by Mead. As U.S. commercial interests spread around the world, so did its diplomatic missions. Instances of military intervention frequently followed. There were  numerous instances of U.S. military intervention in Latin America. This was hardly a record of "virginal isolation."
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  In short, during the period between the War of 1812 and the Civil War, "the United States had forces stationed on or near every major continent in the world; its navy was active in virtually every ocean, its troops saw combat on virtually every continent, and its foreign relations were in a perpetual state of crisis and turmoil."
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  Indeed, Mead asserts that the U.S. owes its Constitution to foreign affairs. Not only did the alliance with France make possible its victory over Great Britain in the American Revolution, but "the inability of the Continental Congress to manage foreign relations under the Articles of Confederation was the first and foremost reason put forward by the supporters of the new Constitution in the great national debate over ratification." (A similar debate is currently occurring in the European Union.) "The balance of power between federal and state authorities" was determined in large part by requirements for an effective foreign policy.
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  The administrations of Washington and John Adams were constantly embroiled in foreign affairs issues. Preventing foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy was a top priority during the Civil War, and one of the explicit reasons for the Emancipation Proclamation.
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  Throughout those years, Mead asserts, the U.S. succeeded because of the skill with which it played its cards. Today, a vastly important and complex global system depends on the continuation of U.S. success in its foreign policy.
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  But there is vociferous criticism of the foreign policy record of the U.S. Mead examines the often conflicting list of criticisms. It is,

• too driven by democratic politics - and too elitist;
• too pacifist - and too bellicose;
• too moralizing - and too immoral;
• too spineless - and too ruthless;
• too self interested - and too supportive of a "world community;" and,
• too supportive of the status quo - and too eager to unleash disruptive waves of change.

    However, its long history of success is irrefutable - and that, Mead correctly insists, has been no accident.
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Continental realism:

  Foreign policy being a non-scientific practical art, it requires the analytical methods of professionalism rather than the application of scientific truths. Even the best theoretical approaches must be viewed with skepticism and applied with caution and discrimination.

  One of the strengths of Mead's multidimensional theory - set forth below - is that it inherently encourages skepticism about application of any particular one of his four major approaches. It also provides a framework for analysis of appropriateness in each policy application.
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  Realist theories tend to draw on the foreign policy experiences of the Continental powers of Europe, Mead asserts. They ignore the experiences of Britain and the U.S. - especially "the liberal, values-driven foreign policy of Prime Minister William Gladstone."
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  "Continental realism" views foreign policy - to a large extent - as "an amoral struggle of all against all," "driven by interests and the quest for power in international relations." Ideals and benevolence simply don't count.
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  Indeed, critics of British and U.S. foreign policy view claims of ideals and benevolence as hypocrisy, and claim that those two nations have in fact "far outdone their Continental rivals" in putting principles of realism into practice in their foreign policy.
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Freedom from fear of imminent invasion gave the foreign policies of Britain and the U.S. their "special character" - a kaleidoscopic complexity of sometimes complimentary, sometimes unrelated and sometimes conflicting objectives.

  Mead explains the confusion by an analogy with a kaleidoscope. Continental powers were forever enmeshed in political maneuvering - "like scorpions in a bottle" - constantly dealing with immediate military threats and opportunities existing across land borders across which armies could easily move. Britain behind its channel and the U.S. behind its oceans, were "outside the bottle."
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  This gave them the freedom to think about other things - to think strategically rather than being always enmeshed in the tactical struggles of the moment. This gave their foreign policy its "special character" - a kaleidoscopic complexity of sometimes complimentary, sometimes unrelated and sometimes conflicting objectives.

  Indeed, not just foreign policy, but the systems of economic and political freedom and individual liberty and civil rights protected by rule-of-law legal systems were due in large measure to England's channel and the ocean borders of the U.S.  The Anglo-Saxon nations could all defend themselves with navies. They did not need large standing armies, and always rapidly demobilized after wars.
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  Continental powers - with their large standing armies always ready to repel invaders - could use those armies to collect domestic taxes and dominate their people. All rights were limited to those granted by the state. But navies can't collect domestic taxes or dominate domestic factions.
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  Thus, in England and the U.S., the state has only the powers granted by the people. It must seek the active support of its people, and gains tremendous strength when that support is given. The people are truly sovereign, and their basic rights are inherent. Government is organized to - among other things - secure those rights. The existence of those rights is not at the sufferance of the government.
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  It should be noted that the Japanese chose to defend their islands with professional standing armies rather than with navies, and thus had a very different history. Of course, Japan faced a frequently united China across its narrow sea, while England could manage a disunited Europe across its channel.

Britain and the U.S. have to be concerned that none of the Continental scorpions devours all the others, but otherwise are free to pursue their wider economic interests worldwide. Their international political considerations are those that establish favorable conditions for their global economic interests.

  U.S. foreign policy was a mix of both "high politics" and economics - with the economic aspects - tariffs, exchange rates and trading rights - constantly in the forefront. Political aspects only episodically rose to the forefront.

  "For American realists, getting economic policy right is the true grand strategy of the state; if we have the money we will somehow find the ships and the men."

  It was predominantly for economic reasons that "the U.S. and its public have been so constantly involved in foreign affairs since its inception."

  "Continental powers and statesmen did not ignore the wider world, but the grim battle among scorpions they could never escape forced their attention and resources time and again away from the wider world and back to the dismal battlefields of Europe. For the Continental powers, European politics was a matter of life and death; world politics was a luxury."

  Britain and the U.S. have to be concerned that none of the Continental scorpions devours all the others, but otherwise are free to pursue their wider economic interests worldwide. Their international political considerations are those that establish favorable conditions for their global economic interests.
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The U.S. kaleidoscope:

The State Department is frequently "a chaotic zone of bureaucratic conflict," reflecting varying agendas supported by various Congressional interests. There is no Bismarck or Metternich in control.

State and even local governments are active, as are business and non-profit entities and even private individuals - all pursuing particular foreign policy goals or engaged in international programs of various kinds.

  Indeed, the State Department itself is far from monolithic. It is frequently "a chaotic zone of bureaucratic conflict," reflecting varying agendas supported by various Congressional interests. There is no Bismarck or Metternich in control.

  "That American foreign policy is rarely the product of a single, deliberative mastermind only begins to delineate the difference between the American article and the European ideal. - - - [There is] the constitutional process, a process designed to create a clunky, shuddering machine that lunges forward in fits and starts, one that is always divided against itself, with half the government almost always investigating the dirty laundry of the other. If that were not enough, the Constitution is designed to highlight the influence of local and parochial interests in the foreign policy process."

  Beyond the federal government, state and even local governments are active, as are business and non-profit entities and even private individuals - all pursuing particular foreign policy goals or engaged in international programs of various kinds. These activities - vast in their combined extent and impacts - have been largely ignored by foreign policy studies and histories.
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  It is not then surprising that many commentators have viewed the U.S. foreign policy decision making process with alarm. The Secretary of State is a short tenure position. Senators like William Borah (1923 - 1933) and Jesse Helms (1995 - 2001) obtain key committee chairmanships and gain stature with their constituents when they upset the apple carts of international agencies like the U.N. or the IMF.  In such an environment, other interests besides the political and economic become a part of the debate - such as human rights, environmental concerns, religious concerns, and regional concerns.

  "[The] Constitution was deliberately loaded with provisions that were emphatically calculated to make it difficult for the government to take strong, active, and swift action in international politics, and the distribution of power among the states ensures that each regional voice will receive due weight in the American political process."

  The makeup of the Senate "ensures that alternative and regional views of the national interest will be well represented - - -."
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"Democratic values, interests, and aspirations" have influenced U.S. foreign policy throughout its history.

  Because of its democratic governance, "democratic values, interests, and aspirations" have influenced U.S. foreign policy throughout its history. The handling of domestic affairs is not easy for democracies, and history is littered with failed democracies. Mead notes the widespread belief that democratic governance is a major impediment to successful foreign affairs. The founding fathers were especially pessimistic on this score.
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  The populace is fickle - excitable - warlike one moment and pacifistic the next - vengeful in conflict - ignorant about the world outside their national boundaries - and ignorant of world history. Democratic government flourishes in an environment of  free and open debate. Foreign policy is full of secret arrangements. Democratic government offers many targets for foreign influence or corrupt practices.

  "It is improbable that the electorate has any conscious clear sense of long-term national policy or interests, and it clearly does not demand thoughtful debate on foreign affairs from its political representatives."

  For these reasons, most democratic governments are provided greater discretionary powers over foreign policy - more authority to keep secrets - than they have in domestic matters. There is "an almost universal feeling among European governments that foreign policy should be, as far as possible, insulated from the turmoil of democratic politics."

  However, the broad, determined and enduring public support for a strong opposition to the Soviet Empire - even after the disappointments with U.S. leadership during Vietnam and Watergate - must also be evaluated when considering the strengths and weaknesses of democratic foreign policy decision making processes.

The Constitutional arrangement forces presidents to take political implications into account in their foreign policy decisions.

Private citizens, groups and associations play sometimes major roles in U.S. foreign policy - sometimes quite at odds with official policy. Westward expansion, for example, frequently ran ahead of official action - especially into Texas and Indian lands.

For all its difficulties and some serious failures, the foreign policy accomplishments of the U.S. during the Cold War years were outstanding.

  The Constitution reflects these doubts over the impact of democratic politics on foreign policy. In foreign policy matters, the federal government is supreme over the states. The President has his greatest authority over foreign policy and military affairs. The Senate is restricted to advice and consent over ambassadors and treaties. The House primarily has its power of the purse. However, this is enough for both Houses of Congress to maintain powerful watchdog committees. Congress has also the power to declare war.
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  Mead notes that this arrangement forces presidents to take political implications into account in their foreign policy decisions.

  "To many observers, American and foreign alike, that is a bad thing and makes it that much harder for presidents and secretaries of state to make good foreign policy."

  Finally, private citizens, groups and associations play sometimes major roles in U.S. foreign policy - sometimes quite at odds with official policy. Westward expansion, for example, frequently ran ahead of official action - especially into Texas and Indian lands.

  "Foreign policy studies that compare state activities in Europe with state activities in the United States tend to underestimate the degree, and in some cases misjudge the direction and effect, of the broad engagement of the United States with the rest of the world."

  In short, U.S. foreign policy responds to a cacophony of voices and interests. During the 40 years of the Cold War, these weaknesses were evident for all to see, and led to more than a few blunders, which the critics of U.S. foreign policy have rushed to point out. Nevertheless, the accomplishments of the U.S. during those 40 years were outstanding.
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  Containment - NATO - liberalized international trade - the delicate dismantling of the great European empires - arrangements to avoid nuclear war - and the ultimate defeat of the Evil Empire - (dismantled not with a bang, thank god, but with a whimper) - were all consistently promoted and ultimately achieved major goals. They were accompanied by a constant flow of minor achievements.

  Compared to the foreign policy achievements of Britain and France after WW-I - starting with the vengeful and financially disastrous Treaty of Versailles and ending with a Great Depression and then WW-II - U.S. foreign policy leadership after WW-II looks like the work of geniuses.

Reality and mythology:

  FUTURECASTS uses the term "authoritative myths" to refer to widely accepted simplifications that twist the truth for propaganda purposes. It is important to keep the distinction in mind.

  The myth of "virtuous isolation" is a prominent example. Established prior to WW-II, it was abandoned in favor of a Cold War myth after WW-II. The Cold War myth accepted the myth of virtuous isolation as a reality that was correct in its day. The Cold War myth accurately emphasized that "the world had changed, and the old ideas didn't work anymore." U.S. mistakes between the world wars were because of its naïveté and inexperience in the hard world of amoral realpolitik.
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  Now, the U.S. would  have to abandon neutrality and take a more active role. The U.S. could no longer be a "free rider in the British world system." It would have to "assume the privileges and shoulder the costs of global hegemony on its own." It would have to establish alliances to preserve freedom in Europe and elsewhere, and  "open its markets to the goods of other nations if it sought market access in return."
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  The myth of 19th century "virtuous isolation" is clearly false.

  "[The] American statesmen of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries had compiled a distinguished record in international relations, and the politics of foreign policy had been intimately linked to the great party struggles of American history. Furthermore, along with Great Britain, the United States espoused a distinctive approach to world politics which had consistently produced better results than the realpolitik of the old continent."

  With the ascendancy of the U.S. after WW-I as the world's dominant financial power, its people began to forget the economic aspects of foreign policy that were so vital when it was a debtor nation before WW-I.

  "Once economic issues drop out of the history of American foreign policy, foreign policy diminishes from a major obsession of nineteenth-century American politics into an occasional hobby. Judging only by the importance of political and military issues, American involvement in world affairs throughout the nineteenth century looked, without too much squinting, to be just as episodic and marginal as the myth of the Cold War said it was."

  This myth was far from benign. The Continental realists of the Nixon administration reduced economics to a distant second place behind political and military policy. By "putting Vietnam ahead of Bretton Woods," the Nixon administration presided over the two costliest failures of the Cold War.

• The defeat in Vietnam "could not have been more humiliating had it been scripted in the Kremlin; the bitterness engendered by the prolongation of the war had not faded from American politics by the end of the century and posed one of the most serious obstacles to Nixon's successors as they sought to continue the Cold War." (It is still there today, and influences the Democratic Party's choice of presidential candidate.)
• The collapse of Bretton Woods "inflicted lasting damage on the American economy and on U.S. relations with both Western Europe and Japan." With respect to monetary policy, this united Europe against the U.S. in a manner that Charles de Gaulle had been unable to achieve.

  "From the collapse of the Bretton Woods system to the present day, Europeans have buried all their differences, however bitter, and cooperated to win greater monetary independence from Washington in good times and bad. The consequences of the chaotic collapse of the system spread further. The inflationary waves set off by the currency  crash led to the oil price shocks and the economic stagflation of the 1970s, which had massive consequences for private investors and for national economies all over the world, undermining governments, exacerbating social conflicts, and setting the stage for such further problems as the third-world debt crisis of the 1980s."

  Many Keynesian economists hailed the collapse of Bretton Woods as a great victory - freeing the world from the restrictions of the "barbaric metal." With incredible stupidity, they celebrated the nation's jump out of the pot - as it fell into the fire of the money markets - without any gold to shield it from the consequences.
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  Mead correctly views the collapse of the dollar gold peg as a wide ranging financial and economic disaster. He is absolutely correct that it was not the oil shocks that caused the inflationary problems of the 1970s. It was the devaluation of the dollar that caused the oil shocks and everything that followed.
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  However, Mead is wrong in attributing the collapse of Bretton Woods entirely to the Nixon administration. The collapse of Bretton Woods had become inevitable by 1972. The foundations for that collapse were established by the Keynesian economic policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, which were continued by the Nixon administration. The collapse was greatly accelerated by the initiation  and escalation of the Vietnam conflict by all of them.
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  This was all sufficiently apparent - for those with eyes to see - so that the publisher of FUTURECASTS could write and publish a book presciently entitled "Dollar Devaluation" in 1967, accurately predicting and explaining why the dollar would be devalued sometime between 1972 and 1974 - and what the consequences of that devaluation would be.
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  Also, the unification of Europe in a confederation of peaceful states is on balance a great advantage for the U.S. and the world. At least the scorpions in the European bottle have been sedated. Europe now constitutes a growing island of prosperity and stability in a still dangerous world. This is clearly in the best interests of the U.S. even if some EU members oppose some U.S. interests and initiatives at various times.

Reagan instinctively realized that reminding people of the many evils of the Soviet system was essential "to strengthen the resolve of Americans and their allies around the world for what proved to be the last act in the long battle."

  Carter and Reagan departed from Continental realism practices to restore to prominence the moral and economic aspects of foreign policy.

  "Ultimately the success of the American economy specifically and the international economy in general would inflict more damage on Asian communism than the Vietnam War ever did, and convince Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev that radical political and economic reform was the only option open to his country."

  Both Carter and Reagan agreed that "a strong human rights policy was a crucial element in an effective Cold War strategy." Reagan withdrew support from Cold War allies like Pinochet in Chile, the apartheid regime in South Africa, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines. Rather than amorally managing the superpower conflict, Reagan instinctively realized that reminding people of the many evils of the Soviet system was essential "to strengthen the resolve of Americans and their allies around the world for what proved to be the last act in the long battle."

  "Morality and economics were back as driving forces in American policy; and in the end they did what amoral geopolitics could never do; defeated the Soviet Union while strengthening the international order whose protection the United States had inherited from Britain."

  This is all very true - but it must be kept in mind that the moral and economic elements became decisive only after the West successfully contained the military and political threats. It must also be remembered that mere moral and economic bankruptcy has not yet brought an end to Communist despotisms in Cuba and N. Korea.

  By the 1990s, "questions of economic order and human freedom had clearly been placed in the limelight." Even Henry Kissinger has now returned to the roots of American foreign policy. And so must we all, Mead insists, if the nation is to continue to be successful into the 21st century.

  "We need to become aware of our foreign policy traditions and history and learn to appreciate our strengths and make allowances for our weaknesses."

The elements of U.S. foreign policy:

Without including these values as highlights of U.S. foreign policy, it will be impossible to generate the public support without which the foreign policy of a democracy must crumble.

  Economics, morality and democracy are restored by Mead's approach as important features of U.S. foreign policy  alongside the ongoing political and military considerations.

  "They are and inevitably will be central concerns of American foreign policy far into the future, and Americans need an approach that, without neglecting or mishandling security issues, can comfortably deal with the central issues of the day."

  If for no other reason, without including these values as highlights of U.S. foreign policy, it will be impossible to generate the public support without which the foreign policy of a democracy must crumble.

  Mead thus not only reemphasizes the importance of economics in foreign affairs, but also the "soft power" elements such as morality and democracy and multilateralism. See also, Nye, "Paradox of American Power."

Economic vulnerability - the result of debilitating payments deficits - fuels opposition to the globalization that is essential for world prosperity and the prosperity of the U.S.

  Economics will again be a prominent concern because - as in the 19th century - the U.S. is again a major debtor nation. As the dollar weakens, it loses its ability to shield the nation's economy from the economic storms of the world. Tariffs and other aspects of world trade have again become among the most impassioned aspects of political debate. This economic vulnerability - the result of debilitating payments deficits - fuels opposition to the globalization that is essential for world prosperity and the prosperity of the U.S.
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  Rogue states will also again be a prominent concern. Writing just prior to 9/11/2001, Mead presciently concludes:

  "From hill tribes in Afghanistan to Islamic extremists in Sudan and hostile nationalists in Iraq, British policy makers and military leaders faced many of the same problems their American successors are looking at today. The necessary balancing act between living up to ideals and standards that provide legitimacy to the world order on the one hand and on the other acting decisively and effectively in defense of one's core interests will be a major problem for American diplomacy in the years ahead, as it was for British diplomacy one hundred years ago."

  Maintaining a favorable balance of power with potentially disruptive nations will be a basic element of U.S. foreign policy - just as it was in 1823, when it was the incentive for the U.S. to issue the Monroe Doctrine in cooperation with Great Britain to prevent the reconstitution of European empires in the Western Hemisphere.
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U.S. foreign policy history:

  The revolutionary period, lasting until 1823, was when the U.S. gained its independence from Great Britain and then worked out the terms of its relationship with the world's greatest naval power.
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  The period of growth, from the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 to WW-I, was when the U.S. was generally content to live within a Britain-centered global order - and leave it up to Great Britain to maintain that order. During the last half of this period, the British came to realize that they might someday need the help of their increasingly robust offspring, and made several material moves to improve relations with the U.S. For its own part, the U.S. began to pay more attention to its own defense needs, building up its navy and gaining strategic coaling stations throughout the Pacific.
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  Then there was the period of disastrous failure between the world wars. Britain's strength was substantially exhausted, while the U.S. vacillated ineffectively between assisting Britain, withdrawing from balance of power activities, and replacing Great Britain "as the gyroscope of world order, with all the political, military, and economic costs, benefits, and responsibilities" that that role entails.
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  Now we are in the fourth period, with the U.S. in the lead role so long played by Britain. The Cold War was just the first major challenge faced.
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Four major philosophical influences:

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  Democracy has on balance - over time - proven to be a beneficial aspect of the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process, Mead points out.

  "The democratic process has provided a method for aligning the policy of the country with its interests that is superior to anything that individual statesmen, however gifted, could accomplish."

"There is a set of deeply rooted approaches to foreign policy that informs the democratic process and ensures that most of the time the country ends up adopting policies that advance its basic interests."

  From the democratic tumult, "somehow a policy -- or even a group of sometimes conflicting and sometimes complementary minipolicies -- emerges - - -."
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  Of course, this is precisely how domestic policy emerges. As with its domestic affairs, the U.S. has prospered with this system. Perfect it isn't. Failures are easy to recall - even colossal failures like the Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930 and the Vietnam War.

  "What seems to happen in the United States is that there is a set of deeply rooted approaches to foreign policy that informs the democratic process and ensures that most of the time the country ends up adopting policies that advance its basic interests. These approaches -- call them schools -- appear very early in American history, and while they have each evolved in response to changes in the international order and in American society, they have also remained identifiable over the centuries."

  The inexact nature of these four predominant approaches to U.S. foreign policy is readily acknowledged by the author. They overlap and are not sharply delineated. While some people are broadly ideologically committed to a particular approach, others dip in and out of them pragmatically on different issues. Indeed, people generally choose elements from several of them rather than adhering strictly to one.
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  Mead is of course aware that not all policy alternatives are based on broad coherent philosophies of how to promote the national interest. Individual policies frequently gain their most powerful support from single issue interests. Free trade or protectionist policies can be fought out industry by industry. 

  For example, quotas and tariffs that protect U.S. sugar plantations are an exercise in raw political influence - not just unjustifiable by any conception of the national interest, but clearly harmful to the national interest.

  War and peace initiatives can be influenced by particular ethnic groups in particular instances. Single issue ideologies support policies of pacifism or socialism or opposite sides on the abortion issue. Environmentalists and organized labor interests often march to their own drummers.
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  Nevertheless, Mead's shorthand references to these four general approaches are useful for purposes of analysis and discussion.

  Like any myths, Mead's myths are subject to hijacking for any and all propaganda purposes. Discussion of foreign policy alternatives on the basis of these broad alternative foreign policy approaches is probably best avoided by those seriously considering foreign policy issues. There is no substitute for evaluating individual approaches and particular initiatives on their own merits. As Mead amply demonstrates, none of the four general approaches has been without its particular successes and disastrous failures.
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  However, for those without the analytical abilities or sufficient interest to proceed on functional lines, broad generalities and shorthand references are essential for intellectual discourse. Mead's are undoubtedly as good as any - and better than most.

  Mead identifies his four broad foreign policy approaches with four leading figures in U.S. history.

• Alexander Hamilton is identified with policies that stress the needs of industry and commerce. Hamiltonians appreciated the British world order, and advocate U.S. replacement of Britain in this task. This approach may also be referred to as "American realism."
• Woodrow Wilson is identified with policies that spread U.S. values around the world. Wilsonian objectives are viewed not just as a moral duty, but also as a practical duty. At present, this school concentrates on democratic values and capitalist economic systems and freedoms, property rights and rule of law civil and commercial rights. In the 19th century - long before the Wilson administration - this approach concentrated on missionary work that continues to this day.
• Thomas Jefferson is identified with policies that somewhat conflict with Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies. Jeffersonians stress caution in foreign affairs, and favor "the least costly and dangerous methods" of safeguarding the U.S. democracy in a dangerous world. Mead notes that Jefferson, himself, did not always act with such caution.
• Andrew Jackson is identified with the populist element in U.S. foreign policy. Jacksonians respond to such passions as "honor, independence, courage, and military pride." They provide the nation's martial class. Ten former generals have become President of the U.S., and many other men have been politically strengthened by their war records.

  This analytical method is not intended as a precise representation of the major U.S. foreign policy decision-making factors. It is an aid in understanding and analyzing - sufficient even to occasionally produce accurate predictions of  "the reactions of American politicians and public opinion to changing international circumstances."
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  It offers insights into the relations of domestic politics and foreign policy. It illuminates its continuity and the relationships of its apparently disparate parts. It explains why development of foreign policy is more troublesome and controversial for some issues than others. Mead finds it useful both in explaining foreign policy history and in developing his ideas of what the goals for the future should be.
 &
  The author is also well aware of the weaknesses in identifying these four general approaches with actual historical figures who were far more complex and subtle than such stereotypes. However, he finds no better way to identify these approaches for purposes of analysis and discussion. His four approaches "are movements and communities of interest and feeling rather than abstract principles." Abstract labels like "idealist," "realist," populist," and "libertarian" have their own problems of identification and evolution over time.
 &
  After all, Marx was not in every detail a "Marxist," nor Freud a "Freudian," nor Christ a "Christian." Nor does this analytical model cover every aspect of the problem. There are many narrow interest groups - economic and religious lobbies, abortion lobbies, etc. - and weak general influences such as the Marxists.
 &

The shifting influences of these four different approaches gives U.S. foreign policy both a flexibility in tactics and continuity in purpose that has served it well. The waxing and waning of the influence of these approaches reflects the strengths of pertinent domestic interests important for providing political support.

  Mead also stresses the existence of multiple subgroups - sometimes sharply in conflict - within his four broad categories. "Wilsonians" cover both those who are satisfied with current U.S. values and practices and those who would radically change them. "Hamiltonians" included those who identified U.S. commercial interests with those of New England and Wall Street, and those who took a broader national view.
 &
  "Readers will have to judge for themselves whether [these four approaches apply] enough of the time to make this theory useful." That there are such different views of U.S. foreign policy at least explains the varying and often conflicting criticism, and why there are always "purists" voicing discontent with the inevitable compromises and accommodations of democratic decision making in foreign policy.

  "American foreign policy is complex at its core. At any given moment it is more likely to be the product of a wide and diffuse coalition rather than of a single unitary vision."

  However, the shifting influences of these four different approaches gives U.S. foreign policy both a flexibility in tactics and continuity in purpose that has served it well. The waxing and waning of the influence of these approaches reflects the strengths of pertinent domestic interests important for providing political support.

  "From this perspective it appears that over time the competition of the four schools for influence yields a foreign policy that is better than the product of a single individual mind, however great -- just as the operation of market forces over time tends to produce an outcome that is superior to the results of any single plan, however wise. The representative nature of American political society means that there is at least a rough equivalence between the political strength of the given schools and their weight in the nation -- and the invisible hand takes care of the rest."

The Hamiltonian view:

  Britain and the U.S. - with their water boundaries - could stress commerce. Since both the buyer and seller can gain from commercial transactions, an emphasis on commerce can transform foreign policy into a win-win exercise. All sides can benefit from increases in trade - and all sides lose from conflicts that disrupt trade and divert production to military purposes.

  "Unlike Lenin, who saw capitalism as the leading cause of international warfare, Hamiltonians see commerce as, potentially, a cause of peace. - - - This intoxicating vision of a win-win world order based on international law often led Hamiltonians to sound almost Wilsonian in their hopes for the future state of mankind; - - -." (This may be true after WW-II and the shift to trade liberalization, but the protectionist trade war Hamiltonians prior to WW-II could have no such hopes.)

  The Hamiltonian view is associated politically first with the Federalists, then the Whigs, and then the Republicans. It is often referred to as "American realism."

• It encompasses freedom of the seas - a cause that has repeatedly been a cause of disputes and wars both large and small. Infringing on U.S. "freedom to travel by sea and air remains the fastest way for foreign powers to start a war with the U.S."
• It encompasses open markets - "most favored nation" status agreements - in foreign markets. The first treaty by the 13 colonies was a "most favored nation" commercial treaty with France negotiated by Benjamin Franklin.
• Opposition to the exclusive colonial trading systems survives the demise of European empires in the form of opposition to trade preferences for ex-colonies whose trade is still heavily controlled by mother country corporations. The recent "banana wars" over EU preferences for bananas from ex-colonies at the expense of "dollar" bananas is an example.
• However, Hamiltonians did not extend the same regard for trade rights to foreign goods. They were extremely protectionist prior to WW-II - favoring New England manufacturers and, by the time of the Great Depression, all the nation's manufacturers.
• While Hamiltonians now favor free trade, the core purpose of trade policy has remained the same. They continue to believe "that national prosperity through an appropriate trade regime is the responsibility of the federal government." Tariffs have never been merely a revenue raising method. They "have always been a political levy, used to shape national economic development."
• Economic interests also focus attention on "strategic" materials that are available from only limited sources. Rubber in prior years, and oil today are typical examples.
• Sound currencies, international convertibility of currencies, prudent budgets, and legal enforcement of commercial rights for both citizens and non-citizens, are required to facilitate commerce. Domestic battles over the Jay Treaty settling commercial disputes with Great Britain, early national banks, and silver coinage were driven on one side by Hamiltonian concerns.

  "The end of World War II would see an even greater increase in Hamiltonian activism in search of international financial stability, and, with the end of the Cold War, the preservation of an orderly international system that promoted free flows of capital would emerge as a keystone of American foreign policy."

  Freedom of the seas and open doors for commerce similarly influenced U.S. relations with Pacific nations from its earliest days to the present. In the 20th century, balance of power considerations - first against Japan and then against China - were similar to those in Europe - first against Germany and then against the Soviet Union.
 &

  The "special relationship" with Great Britain that has remained a feature of U.S. foreign policy to this day is firmly based on mutual trade interests and financial ties. Mead reviews the highlights - and lowlights - of this long relationship. While Great Britain was the only power with sufficient naval strength to threaten the U.S., by the middle of the 19th century, the U.S. had sufficient strength to threaten Canada - thus creating early military balance between the two.

  "Under Hamiltonian leadership, the United States had defined its interests in global terms, articulated them on the basis of its national interests realistically defined and advanced them through a diplomacy that was neither isolationist, unrealistically idealistic, nor amateurish."

  Although not without its mishaps, U.S. foreign policy was extraordinarily successful prior to WW-I, "and the intellectual and political foundations laid down in those days still serve us well today."
 &

"Freedom of the seas, the open door, and an international legal and financial order" that facilitated commerce remained the objectives.

"An economically oriented international system can circumvent the zero-sum problem that condemns purely security-based systems to the endless rounds of dreary war and revisionism prophesied by Continental realists."

  With the fall of the British Empire after WW-II, U.S. foreign policy was suddenly faced with the tactical and strategic needs of fulfilling Britain's global role. While Hamiltonian tactics changed drastically, Hamiltonian principles remained the same. "Freedom of the seas, the open door, and an international legal and financial order" that facilitated commerce remained the objectives, thus providing a continuity to U.S. foreign policy that many commentators have missed.
 &
  Hamiltonian "American realist" concepts remain optimistic - indeed, idealistically optimistic - "that an economically oriented international system can circumvent the zero-sum problem that condemns purely security-based systems to the endless rounds of dreary war and revisionism prophesied by Continental realists."
 &
  The new U.S. created world order would be based on the consent of free nations - attracted by mutual economic and security interests, rather than being bound by some imperial power. (Fear of the Soviet Union and Mao's Communist China would also encourage such consent - a factor that no longer exists.) Prospects for peace and prosperity would be maximized for all participating nations.
 &

Modern Hamiltonian views:

  First - instead of the U.S. assisting Britain in maintaining the world order, it was now Britain that was to assist the U.S. Mead attributes much of the difficulty Britain had in recovering from WW-II to the U.S. insistence that Britain exhaust its foreign financial resources - investments the U.S. was able to pick up at distress prices - as a prerequisite for wartime material assistance.

  This is only partially correct. Far more damaging to the post war British recovery effort was Britain's determined effort to establish a socialist economic system.

  The U.S. also insisted on "open door" access to British colonies. The loss of the imperial preference system of tariffs left Britain with the expense of governing without the commercial benefits.

  Again, the primary financial wound was self inflicted. Mercantilist tariff systems always inhibit economic prosperity in order to provide benefits for the politically influential. Britain undoubtedly gained economically from the dismantling of its imperial preference system of tariffs - and its colonies benefited even more.

  Second - Hamiltonians shifted from the tacit alliance with Britain that extended back to 1823, to a system of overt alliances - with Britain and many other nations - dedicated to achieving commercial and security goals.
 &
  Mead asserts that Hamiltonians like Sen. Henry Cabot Lodge joined the small group of isolationists like Sen. Borah to defeat the League of Nations treaty not because they opposed the League, but only because they objected to the "supranational authority" that Wilson wanted. If Wilson had compromised on that and a few other points, the U.S. would have joined a League that looked much like the U.N. today.
 &
  Third - and "more wrenching" - was the shift after WW-II from protectionism to trade liberalization. This shift was facilitated by the temporary destruction of manufacturing  competitors during the war - and was driven by the urgent needs of the war-torn world to earn dollars with which to finance recovery.  (If similar post WW-I needs had been recognized by the Republican administrations of the 1920s, the Great Depression and WW-II might have been averted.)
 &

The Wilsonian view:

Wilsonian ideals are both "deeply rooted in the national character" and "directly related to the national interest."

Moral values have been employed in ways that sustained the practical worldwide interests of the Anglo-Saxon states.

  Substantial numbers of missionaries have from at least 1806 flowed out into the world from the U.S., "determined to relieve the world's peoples of the burdens of superstition, paganism, feudalism, and ignorance; to combat exploitation of the poor; to promote democracy, public health, and literacy; to reform the world's sexual mores; and to end the oppression of women overseas." Except for the religious objectives, a broad array of secular private individuals have also pursued these objectives abroad.
 &
  Wilsonian ideals are both "deeply rooted in the national character" and "directly related to the national interest." They have long been a powerful influence on U.S. foreign policy, and remain so today.
 &
  Of course, this is not unique. The author easily traces such spiritual and ideological foreign policy purposes back to the ancient Greeks. Indeed, with only some temporary interruptions, the author points out that "competition among powers has usually been linked to a competition among ideas."
 &
  British foreign policy, too, has been powerfully influenced by such considerations - most notably in its 19th century decision to employ the Royal Navy to suppress the slave trade. They also sought to end ethnic conflict in the Balkans, and the Hindu practice of suttee - which pressured high caste widows to throw themselves on their husband's funeral pyres.
 &
  Such influences on foreign policy have been and remain strong throughout the Anglo-Saxon world. Other northern European peoples have similar traditions. However, observers in the rest of the world have noted that these moral values have been employed in ways that sustained the practical worldwide interests of the Anglo-Saxon states.
 &

The conflict over the extent that human rights considerations should be reflected in relations with Communist China reflects the ongoing tension between these two foreign policy approaches.

  However, objective study and evaluation of this vital aspect of U.S. foreign policy is rendered difficult by the powerful but shifting ideological impulses involved. The missionary certitudes of the 19th century are now widely despised by modern day missionaries of politically correct values. Even religious historians have trouble grappling with the frequent unexpected consequences of these early missionary efforts, and the incompatibility of the 19th century goals with those of modern ecumenical movements.
 &
  Today, the author estimates, there are about 100,000 Americans serving in foreign missions. Vast numbers serve abroad for secular NGOs. Mead provides "a quick sketch" of the Wilsonian historic record.
 &
  Missionaries spread literacy and Western knowledge and skills along with religious doctrine. On return to the U.S., they provided information on non-European peoples, cultures and developments. "Diplomats moving to a new posting and businessmen seeking new markets turned to the missionary world as their best source of information. Dictionaries and grammars prepared by missionaries were often the best or the only sources available for language study."
 &
  However, missionary objectives and values often collided with the objectives of local rulers. They also often collided with Western economic exploitation and imperial ambitions. But they often depended on Western soldiers for their own safety and ability to function. In these conflicting ways, they were very similar to today's politically correct secular missionaries - many of the modern NGOs. Indeed, many secular NGOs have missionary roots.

  "In any case we can see that in the secular as well as in the religious branches of the missionary movement there has been a concerted, two-centuries-old attempt by an important segment of the American people to transform the world and to bring about a social, economic, medical, and religious revolution. This group has believed that it is the responsibility of their government to support this effort, and while they have never fully succeeded in converting the U.S. government into an entirely eleemosynary organization, they have had and continue to have a substantial amount of success in influencing and shaping the foreign policy of the United States." (The recent presence of U.S. marines in Liberia is a prominent example.)

Roughly 50% of "foreign culture experts" during WW-II were missionary offspring. Mormon missionary efforts have made the people of landlocked Utah among the most active in international commerce and relationships.

  Missionary concerns quickly came to be a major part of U.S. foreign policy - from facilitating and protecting missionaries and their works to the inclusion of moral concerns - what today are called "human rights" - in official policy and treaties. Mead offers an impressive list of examples. He elaborates on how missionaries not only developed and altered civil society in foreign nations, but also had major impacts on civil society at home.
 &
  "That the United States was prepared for world leadership after World War II is largely a result of the missionary movement." Roughly 50% of "foreign culture experts" during WW-II were missionary offspring. Mormon missionary efforts have made the people of landlocked Utah among the most active in international commerce and relationships. Black and Asian converts welcomed into U.S. churches have helped break down narrow prejudices. Missionary translations of foreign religious texts have introduced those concepts into the U.S., and Eastern peoples and missionaries have in turn established themselves in the U.S.
 &

    Secular philanthropic internationalism and movements for such objectives as peace, disarmament, arbitration and human rights soon followed the missionary lead. (Those who criticize U.S. foreign aid as too little generally omit consideration of the amounts of private U.S. assistance flowing abroad - estimated at twice the amounts coming from the federal government - and frequently more effectively employed.) The influence of these religious and moral movements is reflected in the growth of churches and congregations in non-European lands and the spread of democracy and Western concepts of civil society.

  "The secular contributions of the missionary movement may, on a global scale, ultimately have more impact than do their religious achievements. Liberal democracy has, officially at least, become the ruling ideology in southern, southeastern and most of northeastern Asia. - - - In most of Africa, liberal democracy has no serious ideological rival: it haunts the chancelleries of the Muslim Middle East and duels with recidivist national fascisms in the Balkan Peninsula."

  Human rights, protection of journalists, minority and women's rights, refugee interests, and disarmament are other secular interests with roots in missionary activities - European as well as U.S.

  "Much of the history of this century will consist of the efforts of Wilsonians in the United States and their allies and kindred spirits abroad to realize the vision of universal brotherhood and peace."

Wilsonian principles:

The success of democratic systems established by the U.S. in Germany, Italy and Japan after WW-II supports the Wilsonian view, and U.S. foreign policy now supports pro-democracy activities worldwide.

  Democracies are more likely to reflect public desires for peace, and to share similar commercial, moral and political interests. Democratic systems are more likely to develop rule-of-law legal systems and economic policies that facilitate the commercial activities of the electorate as well as of foreign economic interests.

  "Wilsonians look -- with some justice -- to the evolution of the Atlantic community in the twentieth century as a vindication of these theories. War among these societies was commonplace before they became democracies. Now war among them is almost unthinkable, and they have all grown very rich."

  The success of democratic systems established by the U.S. in Germany, Italy and Japan after WW-II supports this Wilsonian view, and U.S. foreign policy now supports pro-democracy activities worldwide.

  Initial success of such efforts today in Afghanistan and Iraq is very unlikely. Democracy isn't easy. No major nation has succeeded in its first attempt. England's first attempt in the 17th century was a bloody failure. The U.S. failed initially under its Articles of Confederation. France is in its Fifth Republic, and many of the nations of Latin America have made an art form of failed democracies.
 &
  However, even failed initial efforts are not to be sneered at. The sense that people should have a say in who governs them is something that generally survives initial failures - and generally generates pressures for subsequent efforts.
 &
  It may be that only democratic systems have the flexibility to function successfully in a rapidly changing 21st century world - but democracies that reflect concepts of ideological purity are doomed to failure. The trick - so well understood by the founding fathers of the U.S. Constitution - is to recognize the weaknesses in democratic systems, and develop practical forms of democracy that can overcome them.

The noxious despots that threaten Hamiltonian balance of power and commercial interests almost always also trample on Wilsonian moral values.

  Wilsonian policies have aligned U.S. foreign policy with the two major movements of contemporary history - the spread of democracy and "the rise to independence and development of increasing portions of the non-European world." U.S. interests have materially benefited from these movements.
 &
  Wilsonians have supported a more inclusive attitude towards minorities at home, and have frequently encouraged broad public support for the nation's foreign policy. They join Hamiltonians in promoting a stable world order, with reliable international dispute resolution institutions. And the noxious despots that threaten Hamiltonian balance of power and commercial interests almost always also trample on Wilsonian moral values. Thus, more often than not, the two groups align in support of the nation's conflicts.
 &
  Mead reviews a variety of foreign policy objectives in which the two groups generally find common ground. These include peaceful anti-colonialism, various aspects of China policy, and the provision of an attractive ideological justification for U.S. foreign policy. "Whole societies can be, and have been, converted to Wilsonian values." Such values significantly support the soft-power elements of U.S. foreign policy.

  "The United States does not need a Comintern to spread its ideas and build political allies in the rest of the world; the natural appeal of Wilsonian ideas to the contemporary mind does that job without our help."

  Tactical maneuvers along realist lines are rendered temporary by Wilsonian values.

  With the exception of the Axis despots, the U.S. has climbed into the political beds of most of the most noxious despots of the 20th century. Stalin and Mao and a host of more-or-less noxious third world despots like Saddam Hussein have at various times proven to be more-or-less valuable tactical allies - formal or informal - against even worse adversaries of the moment. Wilsonians may cringe - but age old military truths about concentrating on priorities for both attack and defense dictate such tactical expedients. You can neither attack every target everywhere nor defend every  position everywhere.

Wilsonian objectives constantly involve the U.S. in avoidable quarrels with non democratic states - some of obvious strategic importance. Every tactical choice finds many Wilsonian opponents. Efforts at maintaining a peaceful world order are constantly being challenged by the advocacy of radical change in non-democratic but peaceful states.

  Realist criticism does have substance, the author points out. Wilsonian objectives constantly involve the U.S. in avoidable quarrels with non democratic states - some of obvious strategic importance. Every tactical choice finds many Wilsonian opponents. Efforts at maintaining a peaceful world order are constantly being challenged by the advocacy of radical change in non-democratic but peaceful states.

  "Wilsonian lobbies demanding strong action against countries that persecute dissidents, permit the genital mutilation of women, suppress trade unions, hunt whales, eat dogs, oppress national minorities, or otherwise offend the moral sensitivities of some organized American constituency create constant demands for government action. This unfortunately decreases the comfort level of other nations with American power and increases their concern that too much American power endangers their vital interests."

  But this strong moral component of U.S. society is an inherent aspect of its foreign policy, "and those who hope to shape the country's foreign policy must come to terms with it one way or another." On balance, the nation has benefited greatly from it.

  "Far from sneering at Wilsonianism and its acolytes, realists should thank God that they exist. Annoying as Wilsonian moralists can be at times, on the whole they have done much to strengthen the hands of American foreign policy."

The Jeffersonian tradition:

  While Hamiltonian and Wilsonian values are universal and frequently find adherents around the world - and seek as much as possible to accommodate the interests of other nations - Jeffersonians and Jacksonians are concerned only with the interests of the United States.

  "In very different ways Jeffersonians and Jacksonians believe that the specific cultural, social, and political heritage of the United States is a precious treasure to be conserved, defended, and passed on to future generations; they celebrate what they see as the unique, and uniquely valuable, elements of American life and believe that the object of foreign policy should be to defend those values at home rather than to extend them abroad."

  Trade liberalization and internationalist policies are opposed by those who follow these approaches. The Bill of Rights was a Jeffersonian victory, and expansive judicial interpretations of those rights are also victories, as are expansions of suffrage and advances for minority rights. Although in retreat from WW-II until the end of the century, Jeffersonian adherents have had their victories.
 &
  Writing just before 9/11/01, the author thought Jeffersonians were regaining influence in the present Bush administration.

  "The election of 2000 saw George W. Bush adopt key themes from Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideas, speaking in the campaign of the need for the United States to lower its profile, to walk more 'humbly,' and to move back to a narrower and more restricted view of the national interest."

  Of course, reality arrived with the airliner terrorists of 9/11/01, and Bush realized that the U.S. cannot hide from the world. As with Pearl Harbor six decades earlier, this part of the Jeffersonian belief system was revealed to be terribly impractical.

  Mead points out that the domestic policy differences between Hamilton and Jefferson are reflected in the foreign policy differences between the Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians. Both believed in democracy and capitalism, but Hamilton stressed economic considerations and Jefferson political considerations. Hamilton wanted a strong central government with a strong executive, while Jefferson wanted maximum powers left to the people, and diffusion of power to check abuses.
 &

Jeffersonian foreign policy views:

  Democracy can be - and historically has been - threatened and destroyed by its own political leaders - its own military forces - those amassing concentrations of wealth and economic power - and by the people themselves stirred by demagogues into destructive mobs.

  "They believe, perhaps more than anyone else, that democracy is the best possible form of government, but they constitute the only major American school that believes history is not necessarily on the side of the American experiment."

Involvement in foreign conflicts requires a dangerously strong central government, supported by a military industrial financial complex that would provide enough support to the executive for it to dominate the legislature - and the people.

  Jeffersonians generally turned against further expansion after the Louisiana Purchase and the acquisition of Florida. The acquisition of Texas, the Oregon Territory, Hawaii, and the Philippines were increasingly bitterly opposed. Turning the Republic into an empire was "bad business all around."

• International trade arrangements simply enhance concentrations of economic power. 
• The national debt burdens the people for the benefit of the bond holders. "A monetary aristocracy is as antidemocratic as the blood aristocracy of Europe."
• Involvement in foreign conflicts requires a dangerously strong central government, supported by a military-industrial-financial complex that would provide enough support to the executive for it to dominate the legislature - and the people. Fears of massive increases in debt have been traditionally invoked as a reason to avoid wars from the War of 1812 to the Civil War to WW-I (and to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan).
• Economic sanctions are viewed as an appropriate alternative to war. Antipathy for major commercial interests have made Jeffersonians quick to recommend sanctions. (Unfortunately, unless sanctions cover almost all available supplies - as did the oil sanctions imposed on Japan prior to WW-II - they are like shooting yourself in the foot. They invariably are far worse for the nation imposing sanctions than for the target of the sanctions - and almost guaranteed to fail.) As Mead notes, Jefferson's embargo during the Napoleonic Wars was "a dismal failure." Modern sanctions against Cuba and Communist China have proven similarly counter-productive.
• When war is unavoidable, Jeffersonians prefer a limited approach - involving the least possible use of force.

  At its worst, this can degenerate into the "send them a message" approach that failed so miserably in Vietnam and in the Clinton administration's feeble responses to terrorist attacks. If messages must be sent, Western Union is a far more effective - and less costly - method.

• The futility of "nation building" is demonstrated by the persistent failures of democracy in Latin America and now in Africa.
• The defeat of the League of Nations treaty after WW-I was a Jeffersonian victory.

"Like [John Quincy] Adams, [Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman William] Borah believed that excessive intervention in the Hobbesian world of international politics would corrupt and undermine the Lockean democratic order that the American people had established at home."

  But, in 1931, Borah became the only major political figure to recognize what a disaster the protectionist trade wars had been, and to crusade for free trade and international debt relief.

International treaties like NATO have provisions acknowledging the need for Congressional approval for military action.

  Constitutional checks and balances are vital tools that Jeffersonians use to frustrate foreign policy initiatives that require a strong executive branch. Jeffersonians routinely oppose "fast track" authority for trade negotiations. (They are intentionally blind to the fact that protectionism always costs considerably more for the people as a whole than the benefits provided to the politically influential.) The War Powers Act sought to strengthen Congressional authority over military initiatives. International treaties like NATO have provisions acknowledging the need for Congressional approval for military action. Efforts to limit the capabilities of the CIA have been ongoing for decades.

  A Democratic controlled Congress spent much of its time kicking the Reagan administration in the shins while the latter strove to raise the costs of maintaining the Soviet Union's Evil Empire sufficiently to financially drain and defeat it. That Congress played a major role in the 9/11/01 intelligence failures is something few wish to acknowledge. Congressional efforts since the 1970s sufficiently emasculated U.S. intelligence agencies to make them almost intentionally blind to the militant Muslim plots prior to 9/11/01.
 &
  Of course, like any government agencies - given the power - the intelligence services will inevitably abuse those powers. However, it is hopelessly naïve to believe the U.S. can get by without effective intelligence services. The abuses will have to be dealt with as they arise.

  Speak softly and carry the smallest possible stick - the author points out - is the Jeffersonian way to avoid giving offense as much as possible.

  Much of this belief system is just magnificent rationalization of what is frequently just blind unreasoning pacifism that refuses to acknowledge that the U.S. exists in a shrinking and still dangerous world. Jeffersonian protectionism is based on blind ignorance of the major role that protectionist trade wars played in the disaster of the Great Depression. See, Great Depression, Depression mythology.

Jeffersonian successes:

  To remain independent from Great Britain, they joined Hamiltonians in financing infrastructure improvements and raising protectionist tariffs, but tried (generally unsuccessfully) to limit those tariffs so that they did not become permanent entitlements for influential industrialists.
 &
  The successful demilitarization of the U.S.-Canadian border was an outstanding Jeffersonian success.
 &
  The extent to which they limited the size of government and military spending - and tax burdens on the public - prior to W-II, was perhaps their greatest success. This undoubtedly played a major role in the rapid economic growth of the nation. The feared "military-industrial complex" has always melted away after every conflict.
 &
  The failures of protectionism during the Great Depression, and isolationism prior to W-II, dealt a severe blow to Jeffersonians. However, Vietnam brought them back to life.
 &

Modern world difficulties:

Revulsion with the results of WW-I put Jeffersonians in charge in the 1920s and 1930s - with disastrous economic and military results.

  After all, hegemonic power means an executive and standing military of great power. It means involvement in many of the world's conflicts. It means influence peddling and bribery on a worldwide scale. It means vast intelligence agencies and secretive activities and alliances of convenience with the Stalins and Maos and Saddam Husseins and Pinochets of the world. It means commitment to the international status quo - much of which is far from attractive.
 &
  Revulsion with the results of WW-I put Jeffersonians in charge in the 1920s and 1930s - with disastrous economic and military results.

  Mead covers the misconceptions that supported Jeffersonian pacifism right up to the fall of France. However, he ignores the role of Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian protectionism as one of the major causes of the Great Depression and the rise of Hitler. He also ignores the fact that much of the pacifism that continued right up to and even after Pearl Harbor was of the unreasoning kind - not dependent on Jeffersonian rationalizations.

  The Cold War was another disaster for Jeffersonian principles, but their support of the containment strategy as the least burdensome approach to the problem paradoxically constituted one of their greatest successes.

  "Jeffersonians found themselves once more on the wrong side of history, politically speaking, after war, when they either opposed the Cold War outright or argued for a less muscular American response to Soviet behavior."

  The New Deal roles adopted by the federal government - and acceptance of Keynesian deficit spending to stimulate the economy - undermined basic Jeffersonian doctrines.

  Modern economic activism has weaknesses that continuously plague governments in the U.S. and worldwide - with many of the problems being as Jeffersonians expected.

  The need for federal regulation of great corporations was a choice among two evils. (The disclosure approach was an elegant Jeffersonian response to the need for federal securities regulation.) Scientific and technological developments - especially nuclear power - increased public reliance on government experts.
 &

  And then the Civil Rights movement undermined states rights in favor of federal power.

  "What if states and local governments used their power to deny citizens their constitutional right? Wasn't it the duty of the federal government to assert the power of the federal Constitution in defiance of state discrimination? And shouldn't all true friends of liberty stand with the federal government against the usurping states?"

  The Jeffersonian program suddenly seemed like a hopelessly naïve approach to the sophisticated problems of the 20th century.
 &
  Mead reviews the various Jeffersonian responses to the Cold War, as this school splintered into groups ranging from committed pacifists to reluctant warriors grasping at any apparent logical straws for minimizing the conflict.
 &
  Some stupidly accepted Soviet propaganda that the Soviet Union was only a defensive and thus unthreatening power. Some naïvely accepted Soviet peace proposals that have since been revealed as insincere propaganda ploys. Others adopted the ultimately accurate view that the Communist camp could be splintered along nationalist lines - as with Tito in Yugoslavia. They favored arms control efforts. They fought against Cold War policies that sacrificed civil liberties. They defended domestic communists.
 &

  Vietnam, Watergate, and Three Mile Island resurrected Jeffersonian policies. Libertarian  economic policies were revived by the failures of Keynesian and socialist and industrial policy alternatives all around the world.
 &
  These events demonstrated that there remains a continued need to take Jeffersonian concerns seriously even in the modern world. "The American economics profession rediscovered the wonders of freedom." The political benefits of federalism were also rediscovered. A "right of privacy" was enhancing individual legal autonomy.

  Soon after this was written, 9/11/01 once again threw some - but by no means all - Jeffersonian concepts into disrepute. Yes, strong military and effective intelligence services were unavoidable necessities in a still dangerous and rapidly shrinking world - and the Bush administration shifted from Jeffersonian to Wilsonian foreign policy approaches in the wink of an eye.

When conflicts end, Jeffersonians support the rapid abandonment of the military-industrial complex and the restoration to the people, to state governments and to the legislative branch of powers assumed by the executive branch.

  Jeffersonian contributions to U.S. foreign policy have been considerable. They support skepticism of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian assertions - are most prone to analyze foreign cultures objectively - tend to define national interests most narrowly and seek the most efficient means of achieving them - and protect democratic institutions from unessential compromises. Their pacifistic tendencies actually lend validity to military engagements if they appear unavoidable to most Jeffersonians.
 &
  In addition, when conflicts end - either successfully or unsuccessfully - Jeffersonians support the rapid abandonment of the military-industrial complex and the restoration to the people, to state governments and to the legislative branch of powers assumed by the executive branch.
 &

The Jacksonians:

Once war begins, there is substantial popular pressure for waging war ruthlessly - "at the highest possible level of intensity."

  There has been a lust for war as a solution to foreign problems that frequently has characterized substantial segments of the U.S. electorate - the Jacksonians. Moreover, once war begins, there is substantial popular pressure for waging war ruthlessly - "at the highest possible level of intensity."

  "The United States over its history has consistently summoned the will and the means to compel its enemies to yield to its demands. Attacks on civilian targets and the infliction of heavy casualties on enemy civilians have consistently played a vital part in American war strategies."

Total victory in its Indian wars, in the Civil War, and in WW-II, were won by waging total war against both combatants and supporting civilian populations.

  Indeed, the public has often initiated hostilities - against Indians on the Western frontier, against Mexicans in Texas. On other occasions, public pressure has played major roles in the decision to go to war - as in 1812. Mead notes several occasions when presidents found it difficult to avoid hostilities in the face of pugnacious public opinion - and once - in Vietnam - when presidents were unwilling to spend the political capital to avoid a disastrous conflict.

  The Johnson administration sacrificed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers, hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, and vast sums, to temporarily preserve the President's personal political capital. The Nixon administration, too, sacrificed much in its doomed efforts to end the conflict without an appearance of defeat.

  Total victory in its Indian wars, in the Civil War, and in WW-II, were won by waging total war against both combatants and supporting civilian populations. Since Vietnam, Mead notes 19 nations in which U.S. soldiers have engaged in hostilities. The U.S. - despite its strong pacifist element - is a martial nation.

  Mead omits the important point that - in every one of the nations in which U.S. soldiers have seen action since Vietnam - their objectives have been limited and their involvement has been intended to be temporary - and rapid withdrawal or substantial troop reductions are in fact the rule. Where they have been asked to leave - as in the Philippines - they have left. Where people have wanted them to stay - as in S. Korea and Europe - they have stayed.

  Jacksonians are similar to Jeffersonians - except that they emphasize the Second Amendment - the right to bear arms - as the best guarantor of civil liberties, whereas the Jeffersonians emphasize the First Amendment. The Jacksonian tendency to obstruct internationalist efforts offends Hamiltonians and Wilsonians. Their rejection of federal initiatives in domestic economic and civil rights arenas offends Jeffersonians. But when it comes to slaughter, it's the Jacksonians that provide the essential warrior class.

  "Jacksonian America is a folk community with a strong sense of common values and common destiny. It is neither an ideology nor a self-conscious movement with a clear historical direction or political table of organization. Nevertheless, Jacksonian America has produced, and looks likely to continue to produce, one political leader and movement after another, and it is likely to continue to enjoy major influence over both foreign and domestic policy in the United States for the foreseeable future."

A strong distrust of elites and advocates of internationalist initiatives, globalization and "a new world order" finds widespread support.

  With the advent of Ronald Reagan, the more intellectual schools were surprised to find that - even after Vietnam - this warrior tradition was still alive and well in the U.S.

  "Urban, immigrant America may have softened some of the rough edges of Jacksonian America, but the descendants of the great wave of European immigration sound more Anglo-American from decade to decade. Rugged frontier individualism has proved to be contagious; each generation descended from the great turn-of-the-century immigration has been more Jacksonian than its predecessor."

  Populist appeals continue to power political careers as diverse as Ross Perot and John McCain. Old fashioned values such as honor - courage - self reliance - individual dignity - respect for earned accomplishments and age - loyalty to earned authority - equality of dignity and rights regardless of position - independence from church, state, social hierarchy, political parties and labor unions - and old fashioned middle class values, entrepreneurial spirit and patriotism - continue to have wide appeal. A strong distrust of elites and advocates of internationalist initiatives, globalization and "a new world order" finds widespread support.
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  Populist politics treats government as a means for supporting this productive class, while somewhat inconsistently opposing any government infringement on their values. They distrust elites and value direct democracy. Populist politics and politicians are not idealized. They are rough and often corrupt - and that is the way Jacksonians use them. They support the military, despite its acknowledged imperfections. They support middle class entitlements.
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  They support simple, direct policies and are suspicious of subtle and sophisticated explanations for limitations on results.

  "Jacksonian political philosophy is often an instinct rather than an ideology, a culturally shaped outlook that the individual may not have worked out intellectually, a set of beliefs and emotions rather than a set of ideas. However, ideas and policy proposals that resonate with Jacksonian values and instincts enjoy wide support and can usually find influential supporters in the policy process. - - - Foreigners in particular have alternately over- and underestimated American determination because they failed to grasp the structure of Jacksonian opinion and influence."

Jacksonian realism is suspicious of international law, humanitarian interventions, or "world order" initiatives. It prefers private charity.

It is perfectly proper to fight self interested conflicts - regardless of moral and legal niceties. However, Jacksonians are less interested in conflicts that are not clearly about national interests

  Jacksonian realism is actually the closest of the major foreign policy schools to classic European realpolitik. It is suspicious of international law, humanitarian interventions, or "world order" initiatives. It prefers private charity.

  "Jacksonian America is not ungenerous, but it lacks all confidence in the government's ability to administer charity at home as well as abroad."

  Jacksonians view international conflict like a frontier knife fight -- there are no rules. It is perfectly proper to fight self interested conflicts - regardless of moral and legal niceties. However, Jacksonians are less interested in conflicts that are not clearly about national interests - such as in Yugoslavia or Africa.

  "Despite the frequent complaints by commentators and policy makers that the American people are 'isolationist' and 'uninterested in foreign affairs,' Americans have made and will make enormous financial and personal sacrifices if they believe that these are in the nation's vital interests as they understand them."

  The author provides an extensive summary of the Jacksonian warrior tradition and mentality and its world view. They oppose half-hearted wars and wars for objectives not within narrowly drawn concepts of the national interest. But of course, it is they and their families that do the fighting.
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  The other schools may deplore much of the Jacksonian viewpoint - but they can accomplish almost nothing without Jacksonian support.
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The new world order:

  Hamiltonians and Wilsonians remain globalists. The former encourage economic globalization, the latter encourage the  spread of U.S. ideals - democracy, capitalism, rule-of-law - along with international institutions to prevent aggression and protect human rights.
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  Jeffersonians and Jacksonians - while no longer isolationist - still oppose international objectives that are considered too ambitious and far reaching, and encourage the reduction of international commitments. While the internationalists seemed initially to be predominant, by the election of the second Bush, their influence was waning. (And then came 9/11/01.) The 1990s starkly revealed the many difficulties faced by internationalist initiatives - (difficulties that are unlikely to go away just because of 9/11/01).
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  Hamiltonian free trade brought unrivalled prosperity - but also widespread change and insecurity that fed opposition. Inexperienced transition economies made obvious mistakes and had obvious weaknesses - similar to those of the 19th century U.S. - and suffered similar crises. These events demonstrated that market economics requires an appropriate governance structure not always available in inexperienced nations - and difficult to maintain even in the Western developed nations.

  "[At] the turn of the century the Hamiltonian international agenda was still constrained by an inchoate but strong opposition based on deep-seated questions about both the consequences of the Hamiltonian agenda for ordinary people and the degree to which large corporations could still be considered part of the American community. Whether the issue was fast-track authority for the president or support of the World Bank and IMF - - -, Hamiltonians lived with an uneasy sense that, despite more than a decade of unrivalled economic success, they could no longer count on congressional backing."

  The real strength of protectionist forces comes not from isolationism within two of the major foreign policy schools, but from more narrow interests - such as businesses and unions rationalizing their efforts to gain protection from international competition - disgruntled socialists and anarchists still looking for any and all possible levers with which to disrupt capitalist commerce - and environmentalists seeking to stop or even roll back economic development.

  Russia has so far retained democratic institutions, but remains far from reliable either as a democracy or as a partner in maintaining world order. China remains immune to democratic influences. In both of these vital regional powers, nationalist tendencies have replaced communism as a reason for opposition to certain U.S. international objectives.
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  Interventions not based on national interests proved more difficult - more costly in lives and money - than expected, and the results were often problematic or clear failure. The calls for such interventions proved far too frequent for the electorate to support.
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  Internationalist objectives involving the surrender of important elements of national sovereignty to international institutions were blocked by overpowering  public opposition. (Those seeking to expand the scope of the European Union are also running into this kind of opposition.)
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  Wilsonian environmental and labor values brought them into sharp conflict with Hamiltonians. NGO influence in international organizations - and reliance on unilateral economic sanctions in international disputes - were sharply disputed by the two globalist schools.
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  Jacksonian support for a globalist agenda ended with the Cold War. (Does the War on Terror rebuild it?) While not again isolationist, it returned to its nationalist roots. It joined with Hamiltonians in defeating much of the Wilsonian internationalist agenda, and with a broad coalition, it undermines support for continued trade liberalization.

  Mead continues this analysis in terms of his four major foreign policy approaches for such issues as the missile defense system, humanitarian interventions, and other foreign policy initiatives, as at the end of the Clinton administration. While 9/11/01 has changed much of this - providing focus where before there was discord - the potential for discord along these traditional lines remains strong, and will be sharpened during the 2004 election year.

The benefits of diverse approaches:

When they work together, the various schools provide complimentary combinations of soft power and hard power approaches for particular purposes.

  Democratic traditions of compromise and accommodation mean that the various schools work together whenever their interests support particular policies. They provide complimentary combinations of soft power and hard power approaches for particular purposes.

  "As the kaleidoscope of American foreign policy turns through the years, the schools combine and recombine in one new coalition after another."

  Diverse views assure that policy choices will be "pragmatic rather than doctrinal."

  "American foreign policy tends to follow the evidence; it is not wholly committed to either realist or idealist principles a priori, and, in the confused and ambiguous world in which we live, that is probably a good thing."

  When these major schools fail to reach some consensus on appropriate foreign policy strategy, U.S. foreign policy becomes a cacophony of diverse interest groups heading ineffectively in diverse directions. Such a time was the period before 1823 and the period between the world wars - periods of evident foreign policy ineffectiveness. Mead reviews the disastrous failures of U.S. foreign policy between 1919 and 1941 in light of his analytical method.
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  After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. entered another period of drift - "while policies proliferate in the absence of strategy." The author, writing unfortunately as of August, 2001, views the task of strategic consensus in peacetime as the challenge of the 21st century - a challenge that was indefinitely put off by the events of the next month. 9/11/01 would provide "an external challenge" such as drove diverse policy schools into strategic consensus in 1941 and 1947.
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The nation needs the "strategic elegance" that produced the Monroe Doctrine and the containment strategy. It needs to be ever mindful of its limits

  However, Mead's Jeffersonian conclusion still rings true. The nation needs the "strategic elegance" that produced the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the containment strategy at the beginning of the Cold War. It needs to be ever mindful of its limits - of the risks of over commitment. Yet it must find some practical strategy for supporting the world order - such as it is - on which the nation's security and economic prosperity depend.
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  Mead offers no specific suggestions.